مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - ISAIAH BERLIN’S CONCEPT OF POSITIVE FREEDOM AND THE APPROACHES TO POSITIVE FREEDOM THAT BERLIN CRITICIZES

Abstract :

This article argues that in “Two Concepts of Liberty” Isaiah Berlin criticizes some conceptions of positive freedom but he does not deny the meaning and significance of positive freedom itself. In the first part, it is argued that positive freedom, for Berlin, means freedom to do as a subject and doer who determines herself and her aims according to her own desires. Freedom in this sense implies an agent who can realize her aims by being either partially or completely sovereign over external constraints on her actions. Following Charles Taylor and Quentin Skinner, essence of positive freedom is identified as the realization of ends independently of removing the constraints. In the second part, it is argued that Berlin criticizes the positive conceptions of freedom that are based on an ideal of rational self-realization and can transform this ideal into an organic political doctrine. These conceptions, for Berlin, justify oppressing individuals to conform to a single ideal of rational self-realization as a process of liberation, and the rationalist assumptions underlying them conflict with Berlin’s view of value pluralism. Consequently, this article reveals a sharp contrast between Berlin’s definition of positive freedom and the conceptions of positive freedom that he criticizes.