A table masking countermeasure for low-energy secure embedded systems

Future wireless embedded devices will be increasingly powerful, supporting many more applications, including one of the most crucial, which is security. Although many embedded devices offer more resistance to bus probing attacks due to their compact size, susceptibility to power or electromagnetic analysis attacks must be analyzed. This paper presents a table masking countermeasure to resist differential power analysis (DPA) and differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA). Real power and EM measurements are used to verify the countermeasure using second- and third-order DPA and DEMA attacks on a popular low-energy embedded ARM processor. Results show that the new table masking countermeasure provides increased security without large overheads of energy dissipation compared with previous countermeasures. With the emergence of security applications personal digital assistants, cellphones, and other embedded devices, low-energy countermeasures for resistance to DPA/DEMA are crucial for supporting future wireless embedded systems