Wireless Multicast Using Relays: Incentive Mechanism and Analysis

In wireless multicast systems, cooperative multicast, in which successful users help to relay received packets to unsuccessful users, has been shown to be effective in combating channel fading and improving system performance. However, this mechanism requires the users´ voluntary contributions, which cannot be guaranteed since users are selfish and only care about their own performance. Furthermore, users may have heterogeneous costs (which are their private information) to forward packets, and they may lie about their costs if cheating can improve their utilities. To address these problems, in this paper, we model the interaction among users in the wireless multicast system as a multiseller multibuyer payment-based game, where users pay to receive relay service and get paid if they forward packets to others. A simplified case with homogeneous users that have the same cost to forward packets is investigated first. Then, for the case with heterogeneous users, to encourage users to tell their true costs, we use the second-price sealed-bid auction, which is a truth-telling auction, since bidding the true cost is a weakly dominant strategy. To analyze the multiseller multibuyer payment-based game, we observe that under different selected prices, the game can converge to different equilibria, resulting in different user free-riding probabilities and system throughput. We also study the price selection problem and derive the optimal price that maximizes the system throughput. Simulation results show the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism.