Invalidating Idealized BGP Security Proposals and Countermeasures

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is vulnerable to routing attacks because of the lack of inherent verification mechanism. Several secure BGP schemes have been proposed to prevent routing attacks by leveraging cryptographic verification of BGP routing updates. In this paper, we present a new type of attacks, called TIGER, which aims to invalidate the “proven” security of these secure BGP schemes and allow ASes to announce forged routes even under full deployment of any existing secure BGP proposal. By launching TIGER attacks, malicious ASes can easily generate and announce forged routes which can be successfully verified by the existing secure BGP schemes. Furthermore, TIGER attacks can evade existing routing anomaly detection schemes by guaranteeing routing data-plane availability and consistency of control- and data-plane. Toward a new securing BGP scheme, we propose Anti-TIGER to detect and defend against TIGER attacks. Anti-TIGER enables robust TIGER detection by collaborations between ASes. In particular, we leverage Spread Spectrum Communication technique to watermark certain special probing packets, which manifest the existence of TIGER attacks. Anti-TIGER does not require any modifications in routing data-plane, therefore it is easy to deploy and incrementally deployable. We evaluate the effectiveness of TIGER and Anti-TIGER by experiments with real AS topologies of the Internet. Our experiment results show that TIGER attacks can successfully hijack a considerable number of prefixes. In the meanwhile, Anti-TIGER can achieve 100 percent detection ratio of TIGER attacks.