A game theoretic approach with risk assessment for international conflict solving

A game-theoretic approach based on risk assessment for evaluating the effectiveness of the formation of international concords is discussed. An n-person cooperative game in the characteristic-function form is used for international conflict solving. A concept for solution of a game called a nucleolus and its alternative forms are derived, and a two-layer hierarchical system for the evaluation is constructed. At the first layer, the concept of the multiattribute risk function (MRF) is defined and derived by assessing value tradeoffs in the risk profile for each country. At the second layer, for effective formation of international coalitions for international conflict solving, a game theoretic approach is used. The characteristic function of the n-person cooperative game is constructed in terms of the decrease of the MRF values due to the formation of coalitions. The alternative concepts for the augmented nucleolus are compared with each other in terms of the dual solution concept