A study of the comprehensive effects of a top-down policy on UIRs: A perspective of principal-agent model

Seemingly inspired by U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, many economics in distinctive contexts have been, if by agreed prior, promoting similar technology-or/and UIR-related legislation (university-industry relationships, UIRs), as a means of top-down policy aimed at commercializing result of academic research. Simultaneously, there are considerable studies paid attentions on the effect of technology legislation and probably got some findings out of the blue. However, very rare exploration was made to raise comprehensive understanding of the top-down mechanism in UIRs rationale. Based on Principal-Agent theory, this study attempts to develop a pattern to articulate why and how the effects of top-down policy on activities in UIRs vary with distinctive principal-agent relationship in stakeholders among UIRs. This paper compares main UIRs activities prior and post the introduction of Bayh-Dole-like act in Taiwan, one of major NIEs (new industrialized economies) in Asia, empirical evidences seemingly echo with the inferred model. These findings have profound implications for policy makers and researchers who are interested at exploring the strategies encouraging technology transfer of academic research.