DocumentCode
1165005
Title
Being and acting rational [agent design]
Author
Huhns, Michael N.
Author_Institution
South Carolina Univ., Columbia, SC, USA
Volume
7
Issue
2
fYear
2003
Firstpage
91
Lastpage
93
Abstract
Rationality alone is insufficient to specify agent design. Using economic theory, we can program agents to behave in ways that maximize their utility while responding to environmental changes. However, economic models for agents, although general in principle, are typically limited in practice because the value functions that are tractable essentially reduce an agent to acting selfishly. Building a stable social system from a collection of agents motivated by self-serving interests is difficult. Finally, understanding rationality and knowledge requires interdisciplinary results from artificial intelligence, distributed computing, economics and game theory, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. A complete theory involves semantic models for knowledge, belief, action, uncertainty; bounded rationality and resource-bounded reasoning; commonsense epistemic reasoning; reasoning about mental states; belief revision; and interactions in multiagent systems.
Keywords
inference mechanisms; multi-agent systems; software agents; belief revision; commonsense reasoning; economic rationality; logical rationality; multiagent systems; pragmatic rationality; rationality theory; Clouds; Decision theory; Economic forecasting; Environmental economics; Formal languages; Inference mechanisms; Logic testing; Mathematics; Probabilistic logic; Utility theory;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Internet Computing, IEEE
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
1089-7801
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/MIC.2003.1189195
Filename
1189195
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