• DocumentCode
    1165005
  • Title

    Being and acting rational [agent design]

  • Author

    Huhns, Michael N.

  • Author_Institution
    South Carolina Univ., Columbia, SC, USA
  • Volume
    7
  • Issue
    2
  • fYear
    2003
  • Firstpage
    91
  • Lastpage
    93
  • Abstract
    Rationality alone is insufficient to specify agent design. Using economic theory, we can program agents to behave in ways that maximize their utility while responding to environmental changes. However, economic models for agents, although general in principle, are typically limited in practice because the value functions that are tractable essentially reduce an agent to acting selfishly. Building a stable social system from a collection of agents motivated by self-serving interests is difficult. Finally, understanding rationality and knowledge requires interdisciplinary results from artificial intelligence, distributed computing, economics and game theory, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. A complete theory involves semantic models for knowledge, belief, action, uncertainty; bounded rationality and resource-bounded reasoning; commonsense epistemic reasoning; reasoning about mental states; belief revision; and interactions in multiagent systems.
  • Keywords
    inference mechanisms; multi-agent systems; software agents; belief revision; commonsense reasoning; economic rationality; logical rationality; multiagent systems; pragmatic rationality; rationality theory; Clouds; Decision theory; Economic forecasting; Environmental economics; Formal languages; Inference mechanisms; Logic testing; Mathematics; Probabilistic logic; Utility theory;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Internet Computing, IEEE
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1089-7801
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/MIC.2003.1189195
  • Filename
    1189195