DocumentCode
1222038
Title
Bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auctions
Author
Kian, Ashkan R. ; Cruz, Jose B., Jr. ; Thomas, Robert J.
Author_Institution
Univ. of Tehran, Iran
Volume
20
Issue
1
fYear
2005
Firstpage
50
Lastpage
58
Abstract
In this paper, the problem of developing bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auctions is studied. We model electricity double-sided auctions as dynamic systems and use Nash-Cournot strategies for the market participants (generating firms and load serving entities). Through simulation studies, we compare the efficiency and competitiveness of electricity double-sided auctions to those of electricity supplier-only auctions (using the developed bidding strategies).
Keywords
oligopoly; power markets; Nash-Carnout strategy; bidding strategy; electricity supplier-only auction; oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auction; Contracts; Electricity supply industry; Power generation; Power supplies; Power system dynamics; Power system modeling; Power system stability; Resource management; Scheduling; Supply and demand;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
0885-8950
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/TPWRS.2004.840413
Filename
1388492
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