Embedded reconfigurable logic for ASIC design obfuscation against supply chain attacks

Hardware is the foundation and the root of trust of any security system. However, in today´s global IC industry, an IP provider, an IC design house, a CAD company, or a foundry may subvert a VLSI system with back doors or logic bombs. Such a supply chain adversary´s capability is rooted in his knowledge on the hardware design. Successful hardware design obfuscation would severely limit a supply chain adversary´s capability if not preventing all supply chain attacks. However, not all designs are obfuscatable in traditional technologies. We propose to achieve ASIC design obfuscation based on embedded reconfigurable logic which is determined by the end user and unknown to any party in the supply chain. Combined with other security techniques, embedded reconfigurable logic can provide the root of ASIC design obfuscation, data confidentiality and tamper-proofness. As a case study, we evaluate hardware-based code injection attacks and reconfiguration-based instruction set obfuscation based on an open source SPARC processor LEON2. We prevent program monitor Trojan attacks and increase the area of a minimum code injection Trojan with a 1KB ROM by 2.38% for every 1% area increase of the LEON2 processor.