Extrinsic Channel-Like Fingerprint Embedding for Authenticating MIMO Systems

A framework for introducing an extrinsic fingerprint signal to space-time coded transmissions at the physical layer is presented, where the fingerprint signal conveys a low capacity cryptographically secure authentication message of arbitrary length. The multi-bit digital fingerprint message conveyed by the fingerprint signal is available to all users within reception range and is used to authenticate the fingerprinted transmission. A novel approach is discussed where the fingerprint signaling mechanism mimics distortions similar to time-varying channel effects. Specifically, the fingerprint is detectable to receivers considering previous channel state information, but will be ignored by receivers equalizing according to current channel state information. Two example fingerprint signaling mechanisms and detection rules are presented based on pulse-amplitude keying and phase-shift keying approaches. The methods for obtaining the real (intrinsic) channel estimate, the extrinsic fingerprint message, and the primary transmission are analytically demonstrated using general pilot embedding schemes. The worst-case distortions caused by non-ideal equalization of a fingerprinted message are derived using the 2×2 Alamouti code. Simulation results including bit error rate (BER) and model mismatch error using a maximum-likelihood (ML) receiver are presented for both the primary and fingerprint signal, while authentication signal BERs lower than the primary signal are demonstrated.