DocumentCode :
1389991
Title :
An auctioning mechanism for green radio
Author :
Comaniciu, Cristina ; Mandayam, Narayan B. ; Poor, H. Vincent ; Gorce, Jean-Marie
Author_Institution :
ECE Department, Stevens Institute of Technology, USA
Volume :
12
Issue :
2
fYear :
2010
fDate :
4/1/2010 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage :
114
Lastpage :
121
Abstract :
In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with a two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes´ dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding. Simulation results show that significant energy savings can be achieved by employing this auctioning mechanism for a 3G cellular set-up.
Keywords :
Cellular; Vickrey auction; cooperative relaying; green radio; interference management; pricing;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Communications and Networks, Journal of
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
1229-2370
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/JCN.2010.6391367
Filename :
6391367
Link To Document :
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