Title :
Design of truthful double auction for dynamic spectrum sharing
Author :
Shun-Cheng Zhan ; Shi-Chung Chang
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Eng., Nat. Taiwan Univ., Taipei, Taiwan
Abstract :
To cope with the shortage of spectrum for wireless communications, dynamic spectrum sharing through auction mechanism is one potential approach for raising spectrum efficiency and wireless access capacity. This paper presents a design of truthful double auction for multiple heterogeneous spectrum units (TDAMH). Unlike existing double auctions for spectrum sharing, TDAMH not only supports sellers´ and buyers´ diverse demands in quantity but also considers the spectrum heterogeneity among sellers, which are significant trends in next generation wireless communication markets. Furthermore, TDAMH exploits the spatial reusability of spectrum by grouping conflict-free buyers and allowing buyers in one group to share same spectrum units. TDAMH has two innovations. The first is the division of buyers in one group with diverse demands into multiple virtual bidding groups (VBGs) with single unit demand, which allows each buyer to bid on multiple heterogeneous spectrum units and enables spectrum reusability. In a VBG bidding for one specific resource unit, the buyer who bids the lowest will be eliminated but the buyer´s bid is selected for the determination of the VBG bid. The second is a discriminatory settlement mechanism between sellers and buyers that charges winning buyers in one VBG the bid of the VBG and pays winning sellers in one clearing price, which guarantees the properties of individual rationality and budget balance. Integration of the two innovations also incentivizes sellers and buyers to bid truthfully based on supply and demand information. Besides proofs of the three economic properties, this paper provides extensive numerical experimentation to evaluate performance of TDAMH in spectrum rent-out ratio (ROR), reusability and revenue. Results show that, by enabling spectrum reusability, although ROR is below 0.6 in all test instances, the generated spectrum revenue is higher than the expected revenue by sellers in about 40% of the total test instances.
Keywords :
Long Term Evolution; WiMax; electronic commerce; pricing; radio spectrum management; LTE; LTE-A; TDAMH; VBG bidding; WiMAX; budget balance; clearing pricing; conflict-free buyers; discriminatory settlement mechanism; dynamic spectrum sharing; economic properties; individual rationality; multiple heterogeneous spectrum units; multiple virtual bidding groups; next generation wireless communication markets; spectrum efficiency; spectrum rent-out ratio; spectrum revenue; spectrum shortage; spectrum spatial reusability; truthful double auction design; wireless access capacity; wireless broadband access technologies; Decision support systems; Dynamic spectrum access; Economics; Indexes; Mechanical factors; Technological innovation; Wireless communication; clearing pricing; dynamic spectrum sharing; economic properties; heterogeneous spectrum units; settlement mechanism; truthful double auction; virtual bidding group;
Conference_Titel :
Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DYSPAN), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
McLean, VA
DOI :
10.1109/DySPAN.2014.6817827