Intelligent agents for negotiations in market games. 2. Application

Author

Krishna, V. ; Ramesh, VC

Author_Institution

Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Illinois Inst. of Technol., Chicago, IL, USA

Volume

13

Issue

3

fYear

1998

fDate

8/1/1998 12:00:00 AM

Firstpage

1109

Lastpage

1114

Abstract

For part I see ibid., vol.13, no.5, p.1103-8, (1998). In competitive markets, human decision-makers need assistance to determine potential coalitions that they can be part of. Note that such coalitions are legal provided market power is not monopolized. We present an approach for designing specialized intelligent software agents that perform negotiations; on behalf of their human counterparts, and then suggest market strategies that the human can adopt. Our negotiation protocol is derived from cooperative game theory; however, it differs from the game theory literature in requiring virtually no trustworthy information exchange between the potential coalition partners. In the part I we presented the negotiation model. In this paper, we apply it to power markets

Keywords

artificial intelligence; decision theory; electricity supply industry; game theory; power engineering computing; software agents; competitive markets; cooperative game theory; human decision-makers; incomplete information games; intelligent software agents; market games; negotiation model; negotiation protocol; negotiation protocols; potential coalitions determination; Application software; Game theory; Humans; Intelligent agent; Law; Legal factors; Power markets; Protocols; Software agents; Software design;

fLanguage

English

Journal_Title

Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on

Publisher

ieee

ISSN

0885-8950

Type

jour

DOI

10.1109/59.709107

Filename

709107