On a Truthful Mechanism for Expiring Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Author

Sodagari, Shabnam ; Attar, Alireza ; Bilén, Sven G.

Author_Institution

Dept. of Electr. Eng., Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, PA, USA

Volume

29

Issue

4

fYear

2011

fDate

4/1/2011 12:00:00 AM

Firstpage

856

Lastpage

865

Abstract

We study how truthfulness can be enforced as a dominant strategy when a number of secondary cognitive radios participate in an online expiring spectrum sharing auction, held by the primary to lease its spectrum holes. The types of secondary cognitive radios, announced to the primary, are composed of valuation and arrival-departure periods. We show how, by the suitable choice of channel allocation and pricing schemes, the collusion incentive among secondary cognitive radios can be reduced. The performance of the deployed dynamic auction is compared with that of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) offline auction as a benchmark.

Keywords

cognitive radio; radio spectrum management; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves offline auction; arrival-departure periods; channel allocation; cognitive radio networks; collusion incentive; dynamic auction; online expiring spectrum sharing auction; pricing schemes; secondary cognitive radio; spectrum hole leasing; truthful mechanism; valuation periods; Cognitive radio; Cost accounting; Interference; Licenses; Pricing; Resource management; Robustness; cognitive radio networks; collusion; dynamic auctions; spectrum sharing;

fLanguage

English

Journal_Title

Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on

Publisher

ieee

ISSN

0733-8716

Type

jour

DOI

10.1109/JSAC.2011.110416

Filename

5738227