• DocumentCode
    1484665
  • Title

    Fault tolerant ballistic missile defense: defining constraints

  • Author

    Bella, David A.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Civil Eng., Oregon State Univ., Corvallis, OR, USA
  • Volume
    7
  • Issue
    3
  • fYear
    1988
  • Firstpage
    22
  • Lastpage
    25
  • Abstract
    It is argued that a fault-tolerant ballistic missile defense (BMD) system must not increase the probability of accidental nuclear exchanges. This requirement is used to define three constraints for BMD systems: the deployment of any BMD system must be accompanied by deliberate steps to reduce the responsiveness of offensive nuclear weapons by all sides; a deliberate and assured lag time should be built into offensive nuclear systems to allow for real-time assessments of any BMD actions prior to the release of any offensive nuclear weapons; and BMD systems should not have the capacity to cause rapid losses to opposing BME system components or be vulnerable to rapid losses from opposing BMD systems. BMD efforts in both the United States and the Soviet Union are not likely to meet these constraints and therefore should not be considered fault-tolerant. A more limited BMD system is posited as a solution.<>
  • Keywords
    accidents; ballistics; fault tolerant computing; military computing; missiles; BMD actions; Soviet Union; United States; accidental nuclear exchanges; assured lag time; deliberate steps; fault-tolerant ballistic missile defense; limited BMD system; offensive nuclear weapons; opposing BME system components; rapid losses; real-time assessments; Computer architecture; Computer errors; Fault tolerance; Fault tolerant systems; Missiles; Nuclear weapons; Social implications of technology; Software testing; System testing; Tellurium;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Technology and Society Magazine, IEEE
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    0278-0097
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/44.9208
  • Filename
    9208