• DocumentCode
    1503354
  • Title

    Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability by Voters of Optical Scan Elections Through Confirmation Codes

  • Author

    Chaum, David ; Carback, Richard T. ; Clark, Jeremy ; Essex, Aleksander ; Popoveniuc, Stefan ; Rivest, Ronald L. ; Ryan, Peter Y A ; Shen, Emily ; Sherman, Alan T. ; Vora, Poorvi L.

  • Author_Institution
    Voting Syst. Inst., Los Angeles, CA, USA
  • Volume
    4
  • Issue
    4
  • fYear
    2009
  • Firstpage
    611
  • Lastpage
    627
  • Abstract
    Scantegrity II is an enhancement for existing paper ballot systems. It allows voters to verify election integrity - from their selections on the ballot all the way to the final tally - by noting codes and checking for them online. Voters mark Scantegrity II ballots just as with conventional optical scan, but using a special ballot marking pen. Marking a selection with this pen makes legible an otherwise invisible preprinted confirmation code. Confirmation codes are independent and random for each potential selection on each ballot. To verify that their individual votes are recorded correctly, voters can look up their ballot serial numbers online and verify that their confirmation codes are posted correctly. The confirmation codes do not allow voters to prove how they voted. However, the confirmation codes constitute convincing evidence of error or malfeasance in the event that incorrect codes are posted online. Correctness of the final tally with respect to the published codes is proven by election officials in a manner that can be verified by any interested party. Thus, compromise of either ballot chain of custody or the software systems cannot undetectably affect election integrity. Scantegrity II has been implemented and tested in small elections in which ballots were scanned either at the polling place or centrally. Preparations for its use in a public sector election have commenced.
  • Keywords
    government data processing; optical scanners; Scantegrity II; ballot marking pen; ballot serial numbers; ballot systems; confirmation codes; end-to-end verifiability; optical scan; optical scan elections; preprinted confirmation code; Cryptography; electronic voting; end-to-end verifiability; privacy;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1556-6013
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/TIFS.2009.2034919
  • Filename
    5290135