• DocumentCode
    153543
  • Title

    Stealing Webpages Rendered on Your Browser by Exploiting GPU Vulnerabilities

  • Author

    Sangho Lee ; Youngsok Kim ; Jangwoo Kim ; Jong Kim

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., POSTECH, Gyengbuk, South Korea
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    18-21 May 2014
  • Firstpage
    19
  • Lastpage
    33
  • Abstract
    Graphics processing units (GPUs) are important components of modern computing devices for not only graphics rendering, but also efficient parallel computations. However, their security problems are ignored despite their importance and popularity. In this paper, we first perform an in-depth security analysis on GPUs to detect security vulnerabilities. We observe that contemporary, widely-used GPUs, both NVIDIA´s and AMD´s, do not initialize newly allocated GPU memory pages which may contain sensitive user data. By exploiting such vulnerabilities, we propose attack methods for revealing a victim program´s data kept in GPU memory both during its execution and right after its termination. We further show the high applicability of the proposed attacks by applying them to the Chromium and Firefox web browsers which use GPUs for accelerating webpage rendering. We detect that both browsers leave rendered webpage textures in GPU memory, so that we can infer which web pages a victim user has visited by analyzing the remaining textures. The accuracy of our advanced inference attack that uses both pixel sequence matching and RGB histogram matching is up to 95.4%.
  • Keywords
    graphics processing units; image matching; image texture; rendering (computer graphics); AMD GPU; GPU memory pages; GPU vulnerability; NVIDIA GPU; RGB histogram matching; Web page; graphics processing unit; pixel sequence matching; red-green-blue histogram matching; rendering; Browsers; Chromium; Context; Graphics processing units; Kernel; Memory management; Security;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Security and Privacy (SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    San Jose, CA
  • ISSN
    1081-6011
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SP.2014.9
  • Filename
    6956554