Title :
Coalition formation in transmission expansion planning
Author :
Contreras, Javier ; Wu, Felix F.
Author_Institution :
Inst. de Invest. Tecnologica, Univ. Pontificia Commillas, Madrid, Spain
fDate :
8/1/1999 12:00:00 AM
Abstract :
The study of a decentralized coalition formation scheme in a specific power systems transmission expansion scenario is the purpose of this paper. The authors define first who are the agents in the expansion game and provide a decentralized coalition scheme based on bilateral Shapley values. Finally, they allocate the total costs of expansion amongst the agents, based on the coalition history, and they compare their method with a centralized scheme
Keywords :
costing; game theory; multi-agent systems; power transmission economics; power transmission planning; bilateral Shapley values; decentralized coalition formation; specific power systems; total costs allocation; transmission expansion planning; Constraint theory; Cost function; Economic forecasting; Electricity supply industry deregulation; Game theory; History; Multiagent systems; Power generation economics; Power system economics; Power system planning;
Journal_Title :
Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on
