DocumentCode
1536530
Title
Coalition formation in transmission expansion planning
Author
Contreras, Javier ; Wu, Felix F.
Author_Institution
Inst. de Invest. Tecnologica, Univ. Pontificia Commillas, Madrid, Spain
Volume
14
Issue
3
fYear
1999
fDate
8/1/1999 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage
1144
Lastpage
1152
Abstract
The study of a decentralized coalition formation scheme in a specific power systems transmission expansion scenario is the purpose of this paper. The authors define first who are the agents in the expansion game and provide a decentralized coalition scheme based on bilateral Shapley values. Finally, they allocate the total costs of expansion amongst the agents, based on the coalition history, and they compare their method with a centralized scheme
Keywords
costing; game theory; multi-agent systems; power transmission economics; power transmission planning; bilateral Shapley values; decentralized coalition formation; specific power systems; total costs allocation; transmission expansion planning; Constraint theory; Cost function; Economic forecasting; Electricity supply industry deregulation; Game theory; History; Multiagent systems; Power generation economics; Power system economics; Power system planning;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
0885-8950
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/59.780946
Filename
780946
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