Traffic jams: an evolutionary investigation

Traffic at the rush hours is a big problem in every city so that city councils try to encourage citizens to choose mass transportation instead of driving cars. However, this effort is counterbalanced by the fact that travelers´ utilities from car usage are more than those from taking buses in most cases. We build a traffic problem model with many agents who have the two options of choosing the car or the bus based on their memory of utilities achieved in previous journeys. Simulating this problem with a genetic algorithm can investigate commuters´ behavior and can help identify if a Nash equilibrium exists in this model. We find that a Nash equilibrium exists in theoretical discussion but the population does not converge during the simulation to the Nash equilibrium point. Only a few travelers in the population moved between the two transport methods to establish dynamic stability and all others use only one means of transport throughout the simulation. However, some travelers choose to use the bus all the time (which increases the utilities of the population as a whole) even though their utilities are relatively lower than those of other travelers. Therefore, these simulations describe, the emergence of cooperation which is built on some players bearing worse utilities to obtain more for all the population.