DocumentCode
1580098
Title
Nonconvex electricity market design
Author
O´Neill, Richard P.
Author_Institution
Fed. Energy Regul. Comm., Washington, DC, USA
fYear
2009
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
7
Abstract
The ISO market design has evolved over time from traditions, economic theory and power system operations heuristics. Early market designs made simplifying assumptions and analyzed a convex market. With these assumptions, the tendency has been to analyze the markets under the neoclassical market paradigm. Complicating features in market design such as reactive power, unit commitment, pricing and switching of transmission assets and demand participation make the market non-convex and possibly without a core. Market power and lumpy investments present additional complicating factors. ISO market design should be analyzed as a whole before examining the pieces. We examine several methods for analyzing and settling the markets. Also we address the value and role of price signals.
Keywords
demand side management; power markets; power system economics; pricing; ISO market design; demand participation; economic theory; nonconvex electricity market design; power system operations heuristics; price signals; pricing and switching; reactive power; transmission assets; unit commitment; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Game theory; ISO; Investments; Power generation economics; Power system analysis computing; Power system economics; Pricing; Reactive power; Active Demand Side Electricity Market Design; Locational Marginal Prices; Settlements; Signaling; Uplift;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2009. PES '09. IEEE
Conference_Location
Calgary, AB
ISSN
1944-9925
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4241-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/PES.2009.5275398
Filename
5275398
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