• DocumentCode
    1580098
  • Title

    Nonconvex electricity market design

  • Author

    O´Neill, Richard P.

  • Author_Institution
    Fed. Energy Regul. Comm., Washington, DC, USA
  • fYear
    2009
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    7
  • Abstract
    The ISO market design has evolved over time from traditions, economic theory and power system operations heuristics. Early market designs made simplifying assumptions and analyzed a convex market. With these assumptions, the tendency has been to analyze the markets under the neoclassical market paradigm. Complicating features in market design such as reactive power, unit commitment, pricing and switching of transmission assets and demand participation make the market non-convex and possibly without a core. Market power and lumpy investments present additional complicating factors. ISO market design should be analyzed as a whole before examining the pieces. We examine several methods for analyzing and settling the markets. Also we address the value and role of price signals.
  • Keywords
    demand side management; power markets; power system economics; pricing; ISO market design; demand participation; economic theory; nonconvex electricity market design; power system operations heuristics; price signals; pricing and switching; reactive power; transmission assets; unit commitment; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Game theory; ISO; Investments; Power generation economics; Power system analysis computing; Power system economics; Pricing; Reactive power; Active Demand Side Electricity Market Design; Locational Marginal Prices; Settlements; Signaling; Uplift;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2009. PES '09. IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Calgary, AB
  • ISSN
    1944-9925
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4241-6
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PES.2009.5275398
  • Filename
    5275398