DocumentCode
1586535
Title
Does It Pay Off to Bid Aggressively? An Empirical Study
Author
Herrmann, Philipp ; Kundisch, Dennis ; Rahman, Mohammad S.
fYear
2013
Firstpage
3962
Lastpage
3971
Abstract
We empirically investigate the payoff of signaling through aggressiveness in an online auction. To address our research question, we use a unique and very rich dataset containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7,000 pay-per-bid auctions. Our research design allows us to isolate the impact of aggressive bidding, used in an attempt to signal a high valuation to deter other auction participants, on the probability of winning an auction. We analyze more than 600,000 bids placed manually by approximately 2,600 distinct auction participants. We find a strong and significant positive effect of aggressive bidding on the total number of bids placed, and on the total number of participants in an auction. The strong and significantly negative effect of aggressive bidding on the individual probability of winning an auction supports the finding that aggressive bidding is ineffective as a strategy for deterring competitors in an online auction.
Keywords
Abstracts; Analytical models; Context; Cost accounting; Economics; Educational institutions; Timing; Aggressive Bidding; Auctions; Electronic Markets; Internet Markets; Jump Bidding;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
System Sciences (HICSS), 2013 46th Hawaii International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wailea, HI, USA
ISSN
1530-1605
Print_ISBN
978-1-4673-5933-7
Electronic_ISBN
1530-1605
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/HICSS.2013.183
Filename
6480323
Link To Document