DocumentCode
1586871
Title
Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming
Author
Hesamzadeh, M.R. ; Biggar, D. ; Hosseinzadeh, N. ; Wolfs, P.J.
fYear
2009
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
7
Abstract
In this paper, we derive and evaluate a new mathematical structure for market-based augmentation of the transmission system. The closed-form mathematical structure can capture both the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of the transmission capacity. The Nash solution concept is employed to model the price-quantity game among GenCos. The multiple Nash equilibria of the game are located through a characterisation of the problem in terms of minima of the R function. The worst Nash equilibrium is used in the mechanism of transmission augmentation. The worst Nash equilibrium is defined as the one which maximises the social cost, total generation cost + total value of lost load. Thorough analysis of a simple three-node network is presented to clearly highlight the mechanism of the derived mathematical structure from different perspectives.
Keywords
game theory; power markets; power transmission economics; pricing; GenCos; Nash equilibrium; Nash solution concept; closed-form mathematical structure; market-based transmission augmentation; multilevel programming; multiple Nash equilibria; oligopoly electricity markets; price-quantity game; transmission augmentation; Capacity planning; Costs; Electric variables measurement; Electricity supply industry; Mathematical programming; Nash equilibrium; Oligopoly; Power generation; Power system planning; Process planning; Multilevel Programming; Oligopoly Electricity Market; Transmission Augmentation;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2009. PES '09. IEEE
Conference_Location
Calgary, AB
ISSN
1944-9925
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4241-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/PES.2009.5275636
Filename
5275636
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