• DocumentCode
    1586871
  • Title

    Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming

  • Author

    Hesamzadeh, M.R. ; Biggar, D. ; Hosseinzadeh, N. ; Wolfs, P.J.

  • fYear
    2009
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    7
  • Abstract
    In this paper, we derive and evaluate a new mathematical structure for market-based augmentation of the transmission system. The closed-form mathematical structure can capture both the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of the transmission capacity. The Nash solution concept is employed to model the price-quantity game among GenCos. The multiple Nash equilibria of the game are located through a characterisation of the problem in terms of minima of the R function. The worst Nash equilibrium is used in the mechanism of transmission augmentation. The worst Nash equilibrium is defined as the one which maximises the social cost, total generation cost + total value of lost load. Thorough analysis of a simple three-node network is presented to clearly highlight the mechanism of the derived mathematical structure from different perspectives.
  • Keywords
    game theory; power markets; power transmission economics; pricing; GenCos; Nash equilibrium; Nash solution concept; closed-form mathematical structure; market-based transmission augmentation; multilevel programming; multiple Nash equilibria; oligopoly electricity markets; price-quantity game; transmission augmentation; Capacity planning; Costs; Electric variables measurement; Electricity supply industry; Mathematical programming; Nash equilibrium; Oligopoly; Power generation; Power system planning; Process planning; Multilevel Programming; Oligopoly Electricity Market; Transmission Augmentation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2009. PES '09. IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Calgary, AB
  • ISSN
    1944-9925
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4241-6
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PES.2009.5275636
  • Filename
    5275636