Title :
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
Author :
Dobzinski, Shahar ; Lavi, Ron ; Nisan, Noam
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Jerusalem
Abstract :
We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases.
Keywords :
Pareto optimisation; commerce; Pareto-optimal allocation; auction theory; budget constraint; budget limits; incentive-compatible auctions; multi-unit auctions; Computer science; Concrete; Constraint theory; Cost accounting; Pollution measurement; Upper bound;
Conference_Titel :
Foundations of Computer Science, 2008. FOCS '08. IEEE 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Philadelphia, PA
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3436-7
DOI :
10.1109/FOCS.2008.39
