• DocumentCode
    1594470
  • Title

    Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits

  • Author

    Dobzinski, Shahar ; Lavi, Ron ; Nisan, Noam

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Jerusalem
  • fYear
    2008
  • Firstpage
    260
  • Lastpage
    269
  • Abstract
    We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases.
  • Keywords
    Pareto optimisation; commerce; Pareto-optimal allocation; auction theory; budget constraint; budget limits; incentive-compatible auctions; multi-unit auctions; Computer science; Concrete; Constraint theory; Cost accounting; Pollution measurement; Upper bound;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Foundations of Computer Science, 2008. FOCS '08. IEEE 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Philadelphia, PA
  • ISSN
    0272-5428
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3436-7
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/FOCS.2008.39
  • Filename
    4690960
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=1594470