Algorithmic Mechanisms for Internet Supercomputing under Unreliable Communication

This work, using a game-theoretic approach, considers Internet-based computations, where a master processor assigns, over the Internet, a computational task to a set of untrusted worker processors, and collects their responses. The master must obtain the correct task result, while maximizing its benefit. Building on prior work, we consider a framework where altruistic, malicious, and rational workers co-exist. In addition, we consider the possibility that the communication between the master and the workers is not reliable, and that workers could be unavailable assumptions that are very realistic for Internet-based master-worker computations. Within this framework, we design and analyze two algorithmic mechanisms that provide, when necessary, appropriate incentives to rational workers to act correctly, despite the malicious´ workers actions and the unreliability of the network. These mechanisms are then applied to two realistic Internet-based master-worker settings, a SETI-like one and a contractor-based one, such as Amazon´s mechanical turk.