DocumentCode :
1609095
Title :
Cross-Site Request Forgery: Attack and Defense
Author :
Alexenko, Tatiana ; Jenne, Mark ; Roy, Suman Deb ; Zeng, Wenjun
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA
fYear :
2010
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
2
Abstract :
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) has emerged as a potent threat to Web 2.0 applications. Because of the stateless nature of the HTTP protocol, a malicious Website can force the user´s browser to send unauthorized requests to a trusted site. This demo provides hands on exposure of the various ways in which some popular Web applications are exploited using CSRF, in addition to demonstrating techniques by which CSRF signatures can be detected and attacks effectively resisted even before initiation. The user needs only to install a simple extension to get notified about potential CSRF vulnerabilities. Because validating the Referer Header is a common CSRF prevention method, a novel solution to the Referer Privacy issue will also be demonstrated.
Keywords :
Internet; digital signatures; CSRF prevention method; CSRF signatures; CSRF vulnerabilities; HTTP protocol; Web 2.0 applications; cross-site request forgery; malicious website; referer header validation; referer privacy issue; Application software; Communications Society; Computer science; Forgery; Paper technology; Privacy; Protocols; Social network services; Software engineering; Uniform resource locators;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Consumer Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC), 2010 7th IEEE
Conference_Location :
Las Vegas, NV
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5175-3
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5176-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CCNC.2010.5421782
Filename :
5421782
Link To Document :
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