Title :
Evolutionary game of co-opetition strategy among port cluster
Author_Institution :
Department of Management Science School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University Shanghai, China
Abstract :
Based on customer choice behavior and port service substitution effect, constructing co-opetition model among port cluster, finding the equilibrium strategy profile for port cluster coordination through evolutionary game theory and analyzing the port selection of the best service and charges as well as maximum profit. With numerical example to verify the validity of the model, when the strategy profile moves from perfectly competition to perfectly co-operation, the optimal charge will increase while the best service improvement or not depends on the natural container basement, unit variable cost and service cost coefficient; due to long-term equilibrium state is perfectly competition strategy profile, there is a need for appropriate institutional arrangement to reduce the saddle-point position in order to achieve maximize profit for the overall port cluster.
Keywords :
Containers; Equations; Game theory; Games; Numerical models; Supply chains; co-opetition; evolutionary game; port cluster; saddle point position; strategy profile;
Conference_Titel :
E -Business and E -Government (ICEE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Shanghai, China
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8691-5
DOI :
10.1109/ICEBEG.2011.5881327