DocumentCode
1630070
Title
Notice of Retraction
Ultimate ownership, investor relations management and firm value: Evidence from family listed-companies in China
Author
Shui-ping, Shi ; Ben-ren, Shi
Author_Institution
Management School, Jinan University Guangzhou, P.R. China, 510632
fYear
2011
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This thesis analyzes the affection of ultimate ownership to IRM and firm value under family pyramid structure of China. We find that: the IRM of family listed-companies has a negative relation with control rights of family controlling, positive relation with cash flow rights, negative relation with excessive control rights and positive relation with firm value. Further more, the IRM and firm value of family listed-companies has a negative relation with whether or not controlling shareholder appoints to management layer and whether CEO unites as one or not with president.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This thesis analyzes the affection of ultimate ownership to IRM and firm value under family pyramid structure of China. We find that: the IRM of family listed-companies has a negative relation with control rights of family controlling, positive relation with cash flow rights, negative relation with excessive control rights and positive relation with firm value. Further more, the IRM and firm value of family listed-companies has a negative relation with whether or not controlling shareholder appoints to management layer and whether CEO unites as one or not with president.
Keywords
Companies; Indexes; Industries; Internet; Stock markets; IRM; cash flow rights; excessive control rights; family controlling; firm value;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E -Business and E -Government (ICEE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Shanghai, China
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8691-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEBEG.2011.5881448
Filename
5881448
Link To Document