DocumentCode
1639162
Title
Pioneer game in collective actions: Experimental evidence
Author
Wang, Yichuan
Author_Institution
School of Mathematics Nankai University Tianjin, China
fYear
2011
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
Collective actions are typical social and economic behavior, in which free riders exist objectively. Successful execution of collective actions is related to pioneer game, the value expectation and the follow-up sequence of followers. Through localized experiments, this paper verifies that: (i) collective actions are realizable, (ii) free riders can be weakened or relieved, and (iii) the realization probability of collective actions depends on the benefits, cost and sequence of participants.
Keywords
Adaptation model; Computers; Concrete; Economics; Ethics; Games; Investments; collective actions; experiment; pioneer game;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E -Business and E -Government (ICEE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Shanghai, China
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8691-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEBEG.2011.5881821
Filename
5881821
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