Title :
Pioneer game in collective actions: Experimental evidence
Author_Institution :
School of Mathematics Nankai University Tianjin, China
Abstract :
Collective actions are typical social and economic behavior, in which free riders exist objectively. Successful execution of collective actions is related to pioneer game, the value expectation and the follow-up sequence of followers. Through localized experiments, this paper verifies that: (i) collective actions are realizable, (ii) free riders can be weakened or relieved, and (iii) the realization probability of collective actions depends on the benefits, cost and sequence of participants.
Keywords :
Adaptation model; Computers; Concrete; Economics; Ethics; Games; Investments; collective actions; experiment; pioneer game;
Conference_Titel :
E -Business and E -Government (ICEE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Shanghai, China
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8691-5
DOI :
10.1109/ICEBEG.2011.5881821
