• DocumentCode
    1639905
  • Title

    Dynamic Model Making for Iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma Based on Markov Chain

  • Author

    Liang, Peng ; Haiyun, Liu ; Weibing, Liu ; Xianjia, Wang

  • Author_Institution
    Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan
  • fYear
    2007
  • Firstpage
    294
  • Lastpage
    297
  • Abstract
    Consider the bounded rationality of players in evolutionary games and the character of Markov chain, this paper presented a dynamic model for iterated prisoner´s dilemma game. In this model, strategies choosing of players was mapped to a Markov decision process with two states, and this model can successfully simulate strategies choosing and learning of players. It can be used not only in finite populations but also in infinite populations.
  • Keywords
    Markov processes; evolutionary computation; game theory; iterative methods; Markov chain; Markov decision process; dynamic model making; evolutionary games; iterated prisoner dilemma game; Electronic mail; Modeling; Nash equilibrium; Systems engineering and theory; Evolutionary Game; Evolutionary Stable Strategy; Markov Chain; Nash Equilibrium; Prisoner´s Dilemma;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Control Conference, 2007. CCC 2007. Chinese
  • Conference_Location
    Hunan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-7-81124-055-9
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-7-900719-22-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CHICC.2006.4346862
  • Filename
    4346862