Title :
Dynamic Model Making for Iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma Based on Markov Chain
Author :
Liang, Peng ; Haiyun, Liu ; Weibing, Liu ; Xianjia, Wang
Author_Institution :
Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan
Abstract :
Consider the bounded rationality of players in evolutionary games and the character of Markov chain, this paper presented a dynamic model for iterated prisoner´s dilemma game. In this model, strategies choosing of players was mapped to a Markov decision process with two states, and this model can successfully simulate strategies choosing and learning of players. It can be used not only in finite populations but also in infinite populations.
Keywords :
Markov processes; evolutionary computation; game theory; iterative methods; Markov chain; Markov decision process; dynamic model making; evolutionary games; iterated prisoner dilemma game; Electronic mail; Modeling; Nash equilibrium; Systems engineering and theory; Evolutionary Game; Evolutionary Stable Strategy; Markov Chain; Nash Equilibrium; Prisoner´s Dilemma;
Conference_Titel :
Control Conference, 2007. CCC 2007. Chinese
Conference_Location :
Hunan
Print_ISBN :
978-7-81124-055-9
Electronic_ISBN :
978-7-900719-22-5
DOI :
10.1109/CHICC.2006.4346862
