DocumentCode
1639905
Title
Dynamic Model Making for Iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma Based on Markov Chain
Author
Liang, Peng ; Haiyun, Liu ; Weibing, Liu ; Xianjia, Wang
Author_Institution
Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan
fYear
2007
Firstpage
294
Lastpage
297
Abstract
Consider the bounded rationality of players in evolutionary games and the character of Markov chain, this paper presented a dynamic model for iterated prisoner´s dilemma game. In this model, strategies choosing of players was mapped to a Markov decision process with two states, and this model can successfully simulate strategies choosing and learning of players. It can be used not only in finite populations but also in infinite populations.
Keywords
Markov processes; evolutionary computation; game theory; iterative methods; Markov chain; Markov decision process; dynamic model making; evolutionary games; iterated prisoner dilemma game; Electronic mail; Modeling; Nash equilibrium; Systems engineering and theory; Evolutionary Game; Evolutionary Stable Strategy; Markov Chain; Nash Equilibrium; Prisoner´s Dilemma;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Control Conference, 2007. CCC 2007. Chinese
Conference_Location
Hunan
Print_ISBN
978-7-81124-055-9
Electronic_ISBN
978-7-900719-22-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CHICC.2006.4346862
Filename
4346862
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