DocumentCode
1642362
Title
Impossibility Results for Secret Establishment
Author
Schmidt, Benedikt ; Schaller, Patrick ; Basin, David
Author_Institution
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
fYear
2010
Firstpage
261
Lastpage
273
Abstract
Security protocol design is a creative discipline where the solution space depends on the problem to be solved and the cryptographic operators available. In this paper, we examine the general question of when two agents can create a shared secret. Namely, given an equational theory describing the cryptographic operators available, is there a protocol that allows the agents to establish a shared secret? We examine this question in several settings. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for secret establishment using subterm convergent theories. This directly yields a decision procedure for this problem. As a consequence, we obtain impossibility results for symmetric encryption and signature schemes. Second, we use algebraic methods to prove impossibility results for two important theories that are not subterm convergent: XOR and abelian groups. Finally, we develop a general combination result that enables modular impossibility proofs. For example, the results for symmetric encryption and XOR can be combined to obtain impossibility for the joint theory.
Keywords
algebra; cryptographic protocols; digital signatures; XOR theories; abelian groups; algebraic methods; cryptographic operators; modular impossibility proofs; secret establishment; security protocol design; shared secret; signature schemes; subterm convergent theories; symmetric encryption; Context; Encryption; Equations; Mathematical model; Protocols;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2010 23rd IEEE
Conference_Location
Edinburgh
ISSN
1940-1434
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7510-0
Electronic_ISBN
1940-1434
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSF.2010.25
Filename
5552639
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