Notice of RetractionLegal protection of investors, product market competition and corporate capital allocation efficiency — From the empirical evidence of listed manufacturing companies in China

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Based on the samples of listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen security markets from 2001 to 2004, the empirical study shows that there is a positive correlation between the level of legal protection for investors, product market competition and corporate capital allocation efficiency. When legal protection for investors is poor, product market competition can more significantly increase the efficiency of capital allocation. Research shows that intense competition in product markets can make up for the lack of legal protection. we should continue to improve legal protection, at the same time to break the monopoly of the industry and further deregulation, and to give product market competition play fully to the role of governance, so that the product market competition and legal protection complement each other, together to raise the level of investor protection.