Notice of RetractionAn analysis on mining production and policy risk: Game between Chinese local government and mining investor

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

In China´s mining industry, local government plays not only a role of administrator and supervisor, but also a role of special interests subject in some cases. This situation results in uncertainty of policies and brings risks to mining investors. In order to cope with policy risks, mining investors may adjust the mining production to accelerated recover the investment. By applying the method of game theory, this paper analyzes the interactive relationship between local government and investors. Based on some hypotheses, it put forward the utility function of local government and the production function of mining enterprise. Afterwards, it establishes the dynamic game model of complete information. By equilibrium analysis of the model, it illustrates the fact that local government has incentives for taking opportunism behaviors and acquiring benefits from mining investors. This research may be helpful to solve the problems of poor investment environment in mining industry, safety production and utilization of mineral resources.