Title :
Notice of Retraction
Discriminatory pricing of close-loop supply chain in the presence of consumers choice behavior
Author_Institution :
Intellectual Property Institute of Chongqing, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing, China
Abstract :
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper studies the impact of acceptance to remanufactured products by building a three-stage dynamic game model between manufacturer´s pricing decisions and consumers buying behavior. We solve the sub-game perfect equilibrium between the discriminatory pricing strategy and consumer choice behavior. The results show that consumer behavior affects manufacturer´s discriminatory pricing strategies and profit, and as the acceptance increases, the difference between new and re-manufactured goods becomes smaller.
Keywords :
Boosting; Games; Knowledge management; Mathematical model; Pricing; Supply chains; close-loop supply chain; consumer choice behavior; discriminatory pricing; dynamic game; remanufacturing;
Conference_Titel :
E -Business and E -Government (ICEE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Shanghai, China
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8691-5
DOI :
10.1109/ICEBEG.2011.5882579
