DocumentCode
1658339
Title
Notice of Retraction
Performance of forecasting information sharing in dual-channel supply Chain
Author
Li Shujuan ; Zhang Zigang ; Lu Jianfei
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan, China
Volume
3
fYear
2010
Firstpage
133
Lastpage
137
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
To measure forecasting information´s impct on performance of dual-channel supply chain, this paper establishes a two-level dual-channel supply chain model. According to Stackelberg game, performances of forecasting information on manufacturer and retailer were investigated. The optimal pricing strategies of two cases-information sharing case and non-information sharing case are compared. The impact of forecasting information´s accuracy and channel competition on retail´s information-sharing decision are revealed. It concludes that manufacturer´s forecasting information is shared by retailer passively. Retailer can benefit from the information-sharing and has the motive to share their private information within certain conditions.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
To measure forecasting information´s impct on performance of dual-channel supply chain, this paper establishes a two-level dual-channel supply chain model. According to Stackelberg game, performances of forecasting information on manufacturer and retailer were investigated. The optimal pricing strategies of two cases-information sharing case and non-information sharing case are compared. The impact of forecasting information´s accuracy and channel competition on retail´s information-sharing decision are revealed. It concludes that manufacturer´s forecasting information is shared by retailer passively. Retailer can benefit from the information-sharing and has the motive to share their private information within certain conditions.
Keywords
forecasting theory; pricing; supply chain management; Stackelberg game; dual-channel supply chain; forecasting information sharing; optimal pricing strategies; retail information-sharing decision; Computer aided software engineering; Forecasting; channel competition; dual-channel; information sharing; supply chain;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Advanced Management Science (ICAMS), 2010 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Chengdu
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6931-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICAMS.2010.5553269
Filename
5553269
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