Notice of RetractionThe optimal incentive contract for a closed-loop supply chain based on principal-agent

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

It is significant to coordinate interest distribution and improve the overall efficiency of closed-loop supply chain system. In this paper, we explore a two-level CLSCS comprised of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering substitutability and uncertainty in closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry condition, we propose a multi-task principal-agent model to maximize expected income of manufacturer and certainty equivalence income of retailer. Analysis results show the manufacturer will design incentive coefficients and the retailer will adjust effort levels according to risk-averse degree, external uncertainty and correlation coefficient of the marginal effort cost.