The prosthesis as partner: pragmatics and the human-computer interface

The computer can be regarded as a type of prosthesis: a device that extends the range of action of the human mind or can partly replace certain functions of an impaired human nervous system. Like other prostheses, however, computers are never fully equivalent replacements for human functions. It is argued that present computers extend our cognitive `reach´, at the cost of partly paralyzing our emotional `grasp´ of things. They promote contact without a sense of touch. The problem suggested, lies at the human computer interface: in the user´s need to communicate with the computer in order to use it, and in certain pragmatic deficits of computers that make natural communication with them impossible. As a partner, the computer tends to resemble a schizophrenic suffering from severe `intrapsychic ataxia´-the psychiatric term for a radical separation of cognition from emotion. Its flame of reference, like that of the schizophrenic, is detached, rigid, and self reflexive. Interacting in accordance with the requirements of its programs, the computer, like the schizophrenic, forces us to empathize one sidedly with it and communicate with it on its own terms. And the suspicion arises that the better we can do this, the more like it we become