Study on Pricing of a Sort of Maintenance-Service Contract Based on Adjustment of Quantity and Cost

The service value is created by service supplier and customer. In this paper, the relationship between value creation and distribution is described by non-cooperation/cooperation hybrid game. In the first phase of non-cooperation, the service supplier determines whether the service continue and the manufacture determine the quantity of maintaining equipment, then determine the value created by them. In the second phase of cooperation, the value distribution is described by Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model and both sides´ bargaining competence determines the value distribution and the price of service. We use multiple phases pricing adjustment of maintenance-service contract, such as quantity adjustment of manufacture, cost adjustment of supplier and comprehensive adjustment, which guarantees the service value be divided appropriately. We introduce an observation variable Actual Cost, which is regarded as relative transparent cost information and makes possible the adjustment of bargaining competence of service supplier in the next negotiation. Finally a case study sheds light of application of the models