• DocumentCode
    1704044
  • Title

    Inheritance of spatial neighbourhood: A feasible mechanism for evolution and maintenance of cooperation

  • Author

    Shaolin Tan ; Jinhu Lu ; Xinghuo Yu ; Hill, D.

  • Author_Institution
    Inst. of Syst. Sci., Acad. of Math. & Syst. Sci., Beijing, China
  • fYear
    2013
  • Firstpage
    1205
  • Lastpage
    1209
  • Abstract
    Cooperative behaviors are widespread in natural world and human societies, yet it can hardly emerge and be maintained in a population of selfish individuals under natural selection unless further mechanisms are introduced. It has recently demonstrated that spatial distribution and interactions of individuals facilitate survival of cooperation through network reciprocity of clustering cooperators. Here, we introduce another attractive profit of spatial distribution of individuals in favoring cooperation: inheritance of geographic advantage. We note that in spatial distributed populations, offspring inherits not only the phenotype but also the spatial neighborhood of its parents, which leads to that in evolutionary process, defectors accumulate from generation to generation and eventually destroy their living environment and then are eliminated, while cooperators prevail. We propose a mathematical model of this evolutionary mechanism. Numerical simulations and approximate analysis of the model confirm our prediction, which shows that high-level cooperation emerges and is maintained for a wide variety of cost-to-benefit ratio, even if mutation happens at some rate in the evolving process.
  • Keywords
    approximation theory; behavioural sciences; evolutionary computation; approximate analysis; clustering cooperators; cooperation evolution; cooperation maintenance; cooperation survival; cooperative behaviors; cost-to-benefit ratio; evolutionary process; geographic advantage; individual interaction; individual spatial distribution; natural selection; selfish individuals; spatial neighbourhood; Educational institutions; Evolution (biology); Games; Graphical models; Lattices; Sociology; Statistics; Cooperation; coevolution; evolutionary game dynamics;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Control Conference (CCC), 2013 32nd Chinese
  • Conference_Location
    Xi´an
  • Type

    conf

  • Filename
    6639610