DocumentCode :
1706991
Title :
Cryptographic Secrecy Analysis of Matrix Embedding
Author :
Liu, Jiufen ; Chen, Jiayong ; Zhang, Weiming ; Han, Tao
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Inf. Res., Zhengzhou Inf. Sci. & Technol. Inst., Zhengzhou, China
fYear :
2010
Firstpage :
691
Lastpage :
695
Abstract :
Matrix embedding has been used to improve the embedding efficiency of steganography, which is an efficient method to enhance the concealment security. The privacy security of matrix embedding has also been studied under the condition of known-stego-object attack. However, with the development of steganalysis, the attacker could obtain the estimated cover by the cover restoration technique. Consequently, the privacy security under the stronger attack condition should be considered. In this paper we study the secrecy security of matrix embedding using information theory under the circumstance of known-cover attack from the point of the key equivocation. The relation among the wet ratio of covers, embedding rate, and key equivocation is presented. We also proposed a new differential attack to matrix embedding under the circumstance of chosen-stego attack.
Keywords :
cryptography; information theory; matrix algebra; chosen-stego attack; concealment security; cover restoration technique; cryptographic secrecy analysis; differential attack; embedding efficiency; information theory; key equivocation; known-cover attack; known-stego-object attack; matrix embedding; privacy security; secrecy security; steganalysis; steganography; Differential equations; Encoding; Equations; Hamming weight; Image restoration; Redundancy; Security; Steganographic coding; key equivocation; known-cover attack; unicity distance; wet paper codes;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Multimedia Information Networking and Security (MINES), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Nanjing, Jiangsu
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8626-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-0-7695-4258-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/MINES.2010.150
Filename :
5671150
Link To Document :
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