DocumentCode :
1710301
Title :
a Study of Reserve Aumann-Shapley Pricing Mechanism in a Competitive Electricity Market
Author :
Ju, Ge ; Lizi, Zhang
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng., North China Electr. Power Univ., Beijing
fYear :
2006
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
4
Abstract :
In the traditional vertically integrated electric utility, the generators always provide the reserve without any payment. In the electricity market, it is necessary to encourage the generators to provide the reserve through one scientific and reasonable reserve pricing mechanism. The reserve Aumann-Shapley pricing mechanism is put forward in this paper, with the analysis of the costs and benefits, the mutual costs and benefits of the energy and the reserve are allocated basing on the Aumann-Shapley value firstly, and then the reserve prices under the competitive energy market are formed, the joint optimization model of the energy market considering the reserve Aumann-Shapley price is founded, and the influence of the reserve Aumann-Shapley price on the generators´ bidding strategies is analyzed. The reserve Aumann-Shapley pricing mechanism is applicable to the actual model of the electricity market in China, at the same time, the study gives a new idea of the ancillary service pricing in a deregulated electricity market.
Keywords :
power generation economics; power markets; pricing; Aumann-Shapley value; electricity market; generator bidding strategies; integrated electric utility; optimization model; reserve Aumann-Shapley pricing mechanism; Cost benefit analysis; Cost function; Electricity supply industry; Forward contracts; Game theory; Power generation; Power industry; Power system modeling; Power system reliability; Pricing; Ancillary service; Aumann-Shapley value; Electricity market; Game theory; Reserve;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Power System Technology, 2006. PowerCon 2006. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Chongqing
Print_ISBN :
1-4244-0110-0
Electronic_ISBN :
1-4244-0111-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICPST.2006.321498
Filename :
4116306
Link To Document :
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