DocumentCode :
1714271
Title :
A Leak Resistant SoC to Counteract Side Channel Attacks
Author :
Mesquita, Daniel ; Badrignans, Benoit ; Torres, Lionel ; Sassatelli, Gilles ; Robert, Michel ; Moraes, Fernando Gehm
Author_Institution :
Lab. d´´Informatique, de Robotique et de Microelectronique de Montpellier, UMII, Montpellier
fYear :
2006
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
4
Abstract :
This work addresses the problem of hardware attacks against cryptographic circuits. The most dangerous side-channel attack: the differential power analysis (DPA) is discussed, as well the state of art countermeasures. Then new reconfigurable system on chip resistant against DPA attacks is proposed. Results shows that our architecture is efficient against DPA attacks, but also outcomes the performance of classical implementation of modular exponentiation, for key size exceeding 2048 bits, with a reasonable extra area overhead
Keywords :
cryptography; reconfigurable architectures; system-on-chip; DPA attacks; cryptographic circuits; differential power analysis; hardware attacks; leak resistant system-on-chip; modular exponentiation; reconfigurable system-on-chip; side channel attacks; Art; Circuits; Computer architecture; Cryptography; Energy consumption; Hardware; Logic; Robots; Software algorithms; System-on-a-chip;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
System-on-Chip, 2006. International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Tampere
Print_ISBN :
1-4244-0621-8
Electronic_ISBN :
1-4244-0622-6
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ISSOC.2006.322005
Filename :
4116446
Link To Document :
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