Strategic bidding in pay as bid power market by combined probabilistic and game theory procedures

The strategic bidding problem for generation companies (GENCOs) in a pay as bid market is considered with respect to risk analysis for different participant types, in which GENCOs suffer from lack of complete information about other opponents bidding strategies. According to Iran power market characteristics, in which participants should declare their maximum available energy to the ISO, Bertrand model is adopted for strategic bidding in the power market. Then, by transforming incomplete data that each GENCO has from others into complete information using game theory and bayesian Nash equilibrium, a proper method is proposed considering the power market characteristics, for maximization of GENCOs´ profit according to other GENCOs´ bidding behaviors and power system operating conditions because of uncertainty of sources in a power system such as strategic behavior of opponent GENCOs, demand fluctuations and forced outage of network components, calculation of equilibrium point is not enough in proper strategic bidding, so the problem utilized so that risk factor is taken into account. The method is tested on three of participants in Iran power market. The numerical results shows the efficiency of the proposed method for strategic bidding of GENCOs participate in pay as bid markets.