Title :
A simple two-sided market model with side-payments and ISP service classes
Author_Institution :
CS&E & EE Depts, Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, PA, USA
fDate :
April 27 2014-May 2 2014
Abstract :
We consider a simple two-sided market model of an Internet Service (access) Provider (ISP) and Content Provider (CP, over commodity Internet access) on a platform of user-demand. Though the model does not consider provider competition and resource congestion, it does consider advertising revenue, multiple ISP service classes, separate price sensitives for each provider type, and side-payments from CP to ISP [16]. We argue that side-payments are effectively in play even under network-neutrality regulations owing to considerations in Service-Level Agreements (SLAs) of asymmetries in traffic aggregates at boundaries (NNIs) between eyeball ISPs and transit ISPs, the latter serving the CPs remote to the eyeball ISPs. Finally, we consider a game between content providers based on “managed” and commodity-Internet-access services.
Keywords :
Internet; contracts; game theory; telecommunication industry; telecommunication traffic; CP; ISP service classes; Internet service provider; NNI; SLA; commodity-Internet-access services; content provider; eyeball ISP; network-neutrality regulations; noncooperative game; provider competition; resource congestion; service-level agreements; side-payments; traffic aggregates; transit ISP; two-sided market model; Advertising; Conferences; Games; Internet; Network neutrality; Pricing; Subscriptions;
Conference_Titel :
Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), 2014 IEEE Conference on
Conference_Location :
Toronto, ON
DOI :
10.1109/INFCOMW.2014.6849298