Pricing games in multihop wireless networks under interference constraints

In this paper, we consider a multihop wireless network, where Femto Base Stations (FBSs) act as relay nodes, and are incentivized to carry traffic from a Macro Base Station (MBS) to Macro Users (MUs).We first examine the the global problem of jointly optimal allocation of traffic flow and transmission power in the multihop wireless network. We then examine a game in which selfish and strategic relays submit charging functions to the source and choose transmission powers over a MAC channel from the relays to the user. Relay charging functions are considered which yield efficient allocation at the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. We observe that for efficiency, relays should be taxed for the interference it creates to other relays. We also observe that inefficient equilibria occur when the charging function is a function only of the traffic flow rate through the relay. Numerical studies demonstrate the variation of inefficiency with network structure.