DocumentCode
1754144
Title
Dynamic Model of Company Capital Budget and Manager Compensation Design
Author
Zifan, Li ; Lei, Zhang
Author_Institution
Int. Sch., Beijing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Beijing, China
Volume
1
fYear
2011
fDate
28-29 March 2011
Firstpage
1054
Lastpage
1057
Abstract
Optimal contact for the problem of company budget and manager compensation design is proposed under both two-period and three-period, with a bonus pool. If the agent expects that the bonus in the bonus pool will not be allocated totally, he will require a higher bonus coefficient of the second period to provide enough incentive. If the principal expects that all of the bonus in the bonus pool will be allocated, he will gradually reduce the bonus coefficient in each period to maximize his own interest.
Keywords
budgeting; incentive schemes; bonus pool; company capital budget; dynamic model; incentive; manager compensation design; Companies; Contracts; Distribution functions; Fellows; Finance; Hazards; Investments; bonus pool; capital budget; compensation design; principal-agent problem;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation (ICICTA), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Shenzhen, Guangdong
Print_ISBN
978-1-61284-289-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICICTA.2011.265
Filename
5750781
Link To Document