Faster-Better-Cheaper Projects: Too Much Risk or Overreaction to Perceived Failure?

From 1992 until 1999, NASA adopted a Faster-Better-Cheaper (FBC) paradigm-i.e., smaller low-cost spacecraft-for its unmanned missions. When many early missions met their objectives at much lower cost than traditional flagship missions, the FBC approach seemed successful. However, after the failures of two Mars spacecraft in 1999, the FBC paradigm was viewed as a failed experiment. We reflect on the legacy of FBC. In particular, we focus on the organizational learning literature to explore whether FBC, a stretch goal, was a good step for NASA. Previous examinations of FBC have focused on failure rates rather than on cost effectiveness. We revisit the question of FBC by examining all unmanned NASA missions launched between 1974 and 2007. We find that FBC missions resulted in more scientific publications per dollar of mission cost than other types of missions. From our analysis, we perceive lasting benefits to current projects from the adoption of the stretch goals, and perceive that NASA suffers from a bias against learning from the FBC experiment because of the stigma of the high-profile failed projects. We conclude with the recommendation that NASA should challenge itself with stretch goals, but with science goals rather than human exploration goals.