DocumentCode :
1764413
Title :
Constructive \\epsilon -Nash Equilibria for Nonzero-Sum Differential Games
Author :
Mylvaganam, Thulasi ; Sassano, Mario ; Astolfi, Alessandro
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Electron. Eng., Imperial Coll. London, London, UK
Volume :
60
Issue :
4
fYear :
2015
fDate :
42095
Firstpage :
950
Lastpage :
965
Abstract :
In this paper, a class of infinite-horizon, nonzero-sum differential games and their Nash equilibria are studied and the notion of εα-Nash equilibrium strategies is introduced. Dynamic strategies satisfying partial differential inequalities in place of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equations associated with the differential games are constructed. These strategies constitute (local) εα-Nash equilibrium strategies for the differential game. The proposed methods are illustrated on a differential game for which the Nash equilibrium strategies are known and on a Lotka-Volterra model, with two competing species. Simulations indicate that both dynamic strategies yield better performance than the strategies resulting from the solution of the linear-quadratic approximation of the problem.
Keywords :
game theory; infinite horizon; partial differential equations; predator-prey systems; Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial-differential equations; Lotka-Volterra model; competing species; constructive ε-Nash equilibria; dynamic strategies; infinite-horizon-nonzero-sum differential games; local εα-Nash equilibrium strategies; Approximation methods; Games; Linear matrix inequalities; Nash equilibrium; Riccati equations; State feedback; Closed-loop systems; control design; nonlinear control systems;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
0018-9286
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/TAC.2014.2362334
Filename :
6918427
Link To Document :
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