• DocumentCode
    1764413
  • Title

    Constructive \\epsilon -Nash Equilibria for Nonzero-Sum Differential Games

  • Author

    Mylvaganam, Thulasi ; Sassano, Mario ; Astolfi, Alessandro

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. & Electron. Eng., Imperial Coll. London, London, UK
  • Volume
    60
  • Issue
    4
  • fYear
    2015
  • fDate
    42095
  • Firstpage
    950
  • Lastpage
    965
  • Abstract
    In this paper, a class of infinite-horizon, nonzero-sum differential games and their Nash equilibria are studied and the notion of εα-Nash equilibrium strategies is introduced. Dynamic strategies satisfying partial differential inequalities in place of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equations associated with the differential games are constructed. These strategies constitute (local) εα-Nash equilibrium strategies for the differential game. The proposed methods are illustrated on a differential game for which the Nash equilibrium strategies are known and on a Lotka-Volterra model, with two competing species. Simulations indicate that both dynamic strategies yield better performance than the strategies resulting from the solution of the linear-quadratic approximation of the problem.
  • Keywords
    game theory; infinite horizon; partial differential equations; predator-prey systems; Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial-differential equations; Lotka-Volterra model; competing species; constructive ε-Nash equilibria; dynamic strategies; infinite-horizon-nonzero-sum differential games; local εα-Nash equilibrium strategies; Approximation methods; Games; Linear matrix inequalities; Nash equilibrium; Riccati equations; State feedback; Closed-loop systems; control design; nonlinear control systems;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    0018-9286
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/TAC.2014.2362334
  • Filename
    6918427