Title :
Mechanism design for enterprise transportation outsourcing based on combinatorial auction
Author_Institution :
Res. Center for Contemporary Manage., Beijing Jiao Tong Univ., Beijing, China
Abstract :
In order to reduce logistics costs, plenty of enterprises outsource transportation service to a third logistics service provider. As transportation involves a number of routes, outsourcing may be distributed to several logistics service providers. In this paper, combinatorial auction and mechanism design theory are introduced to transportation routes planning. logistics service providers are selected by bidding. A feasible mechanism maximizes the common profits of both the enterprise and logistics service providers are designed. The mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility, individual rationality and ex post budget balance. Besides, an available algorithm is proposed for solving such a problem.
Keywords :
combinatorial mathematics; cost reduction; logistics; transportation; budget balance; combinatorial auction; enterprise transportation outsourcing; incentive compatibility; logistics cost reduction; mechanism design theory; rationality; third logistics service provider; transportation route planning; Companies; Educational institutions; Logistics; Outsourcing; Procurement; Transportation; combinatorial auction; incentive compatibility Introduction; mechanism design;
Conference_Titel :
Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM), 2014 11th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Beijing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-3133-0
DOI :
10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6874140