DocumentCode :
1786969
Title :
Fort-NoCs: Mitigating the threat of a compromised NoC
Author :
Ancajas, Dean Michael ; Chakraborty, Koushik ; Roy, Sandip
Author_Institution :
Bridge Lab., Utah State Univ., Logan, UT, USA
fYear :
2014
fDate :
1-5 June 2014
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
6
Abstract :
In this paper, we uncover a novel and imminent threat to an emerging computing paradigm: MPSoCs built with 3rd party IP NoCs. We demonstrate that a compromised NoC (C-NoC) can enable a range of security attacks with an accomplice software component. To counteract these threats, we propose Fort-NoCs, a series of techniques that work together to provide protection from a C-NoC in an MPSoC. Fort-NoCs´s foolproof protection disables covert backdoor activation, and reduces the chance of a successful side-channel attack by “clouding” the information obtained by an attacker. Compared to recently proposed techniques, Fort-NoCs offers a substantially better protection with lower overheads.
Keywords :
cryptography; industrial property; multiprocessing systems; network-on-chip; 3rd party IP NoCs; MPSoCs; accomplice software component; backdoor activation; compromised NoC; fort-NoCs foolproof protection; security attacks; side-channel attack; Hardware; IP networks; Measurement; Pipelines; Standards; System-on-chip; Trojan horses;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2014 51st ACM/EDAC/IEEE
Conference_Location :
San Francisco, CA
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1145/2593069.2593144
Filename :
6881485
Link To Document :
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