Bargaining-Based Dynamic Decision for Cooperative Authentication in MANETs

In MANETs, cooperative authentication, requiring cooperation of neighbor nodes, is a significant authenticate technique. However, when nodes participate in cooperation, their location may easily be tracked by misbehaving nodes, meanwhile, their resources will be consumed. These two factors lead selfish nodes reluctant participate in cooperation and decrease the probability of correct authentication. To encourage nodes to take part in cooperation, we proposed a bargaining-based dynamic game model for cooperative authentication to analyze dynamic behaviors of nodes and help nodes decide whether to participate in cooperation or not. Further, to analyze the dynamic decision-making of nodes, we discussed two situations - complete information and incomplete information, respectively. Under complete information, Sub game Perfect Nash Equilibriums are obtained to guide nodes to choose its optimal strategy to maximize its utility. In reality, nodes often do not have good knowledge about others´ utility (this case is often called incomplete information). To dealt with this case, Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is established to eliminate the implausible Equilibriums. Based on the model, we designed two algorithms for complete information and incomplete information,, and the simulation results demonstrate that in our model nodes participating in cooperation will maximize their location privacy and minimize their resources consumption with ensuing the probability of correct authentication. Both of algorithms can improve the success rate of cooperative authentication and extend the network lifetime to 160%-360.6%.